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BOOKS REVIEWED
The Law of Contracts. By John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo. St. Paul:
West Publishing Co. 1970. Pp. xxx, 621. $11.00.
REVIEW I
Hee learned to frame his cases from putting Riddles and imitating MER-
LINS PROPHESIES, and so set all the Crosse rowe together by the cares.
These words may seem to describe the typical Socratic method of law school
teaching, but they long antedate modem legal education, appearing as the
description of "a meere Common Lawyer" published in England in 1615.1 The
reference to the "Crosse rowe" is the connection between that early statement
and this review, for the allusion is to the first line appearing in ancient horn-
books, and the book being reviewed is one of the latest in West's Hornbook
Series.
No modem day reviewer of any hornbook, no matter how excellent, can hope
to surpass or even equal the encomium of the original hornbooks in a poem of
one Thomas Tickell written (while the author was incapacitated by gout! )- in
1728. The following extracts will present the high esteem in which hornbooks
were once held:
Hail ancient Book, most venerable Code,
Learning's first Cradle and its last Abodel
'Twas Cadmus, who the first Materials brought
Of all the Learning, which has since been taught,
Soon made compleat; for Mortals ne'er shall know
More than contain'd of old the Christ-cross Row;
But how shall I thy endless Virtues tell,
In which thou dost all other Books excell?
No greasy Thumbs, thy spotless Leaf can soil,
Nor crooked Dogs Ears thy smooth Corners spoil;
In idle Pages no Errata stand,
To tell the Blunders of the PRINTER'S Hand:
No fulsom Dedication here is writ,
Nor fiatt'ring Verse to praise the Author's Wite
The Margin with no tedious Notes is vext;
Nor various Readings to confound the Text:
All Parties in thy lit'ral Sense agree,
1. A. Tuer, History of the Horn-Book 73 (1897). The description is of one of the
"Characters" in "New and Choise Characters, of severall Authors, Together with that exquisite
and unmatcht Poeme, The Wife, Written by Syr Thomas Overburie. London ... Printed
by Thomas Creede for Lawrence Lisle at the Tygershead in Pauls Churchyard, 1615."
2. The reviewer feels a bond across the years, for he now is hampered by a broken thumb
which intereferes with the use of writing tools.
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Thou perfect Center of Concordancy!
Thy Heavenly Notes like Angels musick cheer
Departing Souls, and sooth the dying Ear.
An Agent Peasant, on his latest Bed,
Wish'd for a Friend some godly Book to read.
The pious Grandson, thy known Handle takes,
And (Eyes lift up,) this sav'ry Lecture makes:
Great A, he gravely roar'd, th' important Sound
The empty Walls and hollow Roof rebound:
Th' Expiring Ancient rear'd his drooping Head,
And thank'd his Stars that Hodge had learn'd to read;
Great B, the Yonker bawls: 0 heavenly, Breathl
What Ghostly Comforts in the Hour of Deathl
What Hopes I feel. Great C, pronounc'd the Boy;
The Grandsire dyes with Ecstacy of Joy.
All humane Arts, and ev'ry Science meet,
Within the Limits of thy single Sheet,
From thy vast Root, all Learning's Branches grow,
And all her Streams from thy deep Fountain flow.8
The book Professors Calamari and Perillo have written about the law of
Contracts is excellent and deserves praise, but times have changed and this
reviewer lacks the style of the good Mr. Tickel, so this review will suffer some-
what by comparison. Nonetheless, it should be made clear that the reviewer
finds the Calamari and Perillo book to be a joy to read and use, and a book
most likely to be of value to law students struggling with the law of contracts.
The advantages to be gained from the use of any hornbook may be debat-
able. As a law student, this reviewer first gained exposure to that kind of book
in a first-year course in "Common Law Pleading." The casebook, whose author
I cannot recall, seemed to be a mismash of unrelated cases involving horse
back riders running into logs left in odd places on muddy roads, horses dumped
into raging streams by ferry boat operators, and a variety of events whose
relevance to the age of the chrome plated, code pleaded motor vehicle was at
best obscured. It fell to one of the first of the West Hornbook Series, Shipman
on Common Law Pleading,4 to extract the then eternal verities and subsume
the materials in tolerably manageable proportions under chapters on Trespass,
Trespass on the Case, Assumpsit, and the like. From that early exposure, this
reviewer has been grateful and appreciative for books that can concisely provide
a tool which a student can use to fill gaps and organize materials offered by the
case method of study.
Messrs. Calamari and Perillo have produced a treatise on contracts which
seems to this reviewer to have the following major characteristics: first, the
style is clear, accurate, precise, and concise. Too often authors, in seeking
3. A. Tuer, supra note 1, at 224-29.
4. B. Shipman, Hand-Book of Common-Law Pleading (1894).
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brevity, make statements that literally raise more questions than they answer.
More often than this, statements appear which are devoid of applicability to
resolve any particular issue. I do not find these egregious errors present in this
book. Indeed, there are virtually no instances where I would take issue with
conclusions reached by the authors, though I am troubled by the statement that:
"Similarly, a guaranty of payment made after the principal obligation has
arisen does not bind the guarantor unless new detriment is incurred by the
promisee in exchange for the guaranty."' ; I am concerned by the impact of
section 3-408 of the Uniform Commercial Code on that problem.
This leads to the second characteristic of the book: aside from the detail
in the previous paragraph, the book is extremely well oriented to the Uniform
Commercial Code. If no other justification exists for a new book at this time,
the authors' care in analyzing the UCC's impact is enough. Indeed, students
who use the book will need constantly to keep in mind that the UCC does not
govern all kinds of contracts. Thus, in the discussion of auction sales, an
important footnote appears, identifying the possible application of Commercial
Code doctrine to non-covered transactions. 6 Nonetheless, a shock is experienced
when, after the rubric is announced that the sale or contract is final at the
fall of the hammer, a wiser than average student asks if this can possibly be
true of sales of real estate, and if so what provides the written memorandum to
bind the bidder.
Indeed, the book is characterized by extensive reliance on authority, and
this seems to be the third major characteristic. Publishers have always seemed
to the present reviewer to throw a curtain of silence about available texts,
tending to limit references to books to which they hold the copyright. Messrs.
Calamari and Perillo have leaned extensively on Professor Corbin's book, but
in addition they give extensive references to and quotations from the works of
Williston, Simpson, Duesenberg, and King-to cite only those books which have
tended to become recognized authorities in contracting under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. It is almost as if Macy's is telling its customers that some goodies
are available at Gimbel's.
The authors do not intrude their own pet ideas about what the law of con-
tracts ought to be. Where differences among the available authorities exist,
they state the view they deem preferable-but loyalty to the given doctrinal
authority pervades the book. Argument by reference to authority, then, rather
than by reason tends to characterize the book. The discussion of the Parol
Evidence Rule, though, is a notable instance where the authors' have presented
policy considerations to aid the student reader in reaching decisions about the
desirability of a particular rule of law. Thus the book is not entirely limited
to citations to authority without supporting argument.
Among the authorities relied upon rather extensively is the Restatement of
Contracts, Second. In view of the fact that if the present version of that Re-
statement is finally approved, many established usages in the field of contracts
5. J. Calanari & J. Perilo, The Law of Contracts § 54, at 106 (1970).
6. Id. § 19, at 23 n.49.
19711
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
may become obsolete, the desirability of references thereto is obvious. One
thinks at this point of the efforts to eliminate terms like "unilateral," "bi-
lateral," "creditor beneficiary," "donee beneficiary" and the like-such usages
are currently as habitual as "meeting of the minds" was to former generations,
so the habits may be hard to extirpate.
Earlier hornbooks tended to announce doctrines in rubric form, so that the
student found "the rule" in bold type, thus reducing eystrain, for the lighter
type could be omitted. Even the text that was contained in those old books
tended to be written as statements of rules devoid of any factual content. This
lulled the student into memorizing rules which he was unable to apply to any
known set of facts, thus deferring or terminating his legal education until he
learned that the essence of law is application of doctrine to facts in the real
world. Professors Calamari and Perillo avoid this by frequent brief, but accu-
rate, summaries of the facts of the cases from which the rules derive. No doubt
by this, they help students to appreciate the rules they read, to see how they
apply, and thus to discern their very limits. How often do students announce
after an unsuccessful examination that they knew all the rules but couldn't
seem to put them down on the paper? The relationship of rule to facts is often
the essential missing ingredient, so the factual content of law must not be
overlooked.
The final observed characteristic of the Calamari and Perillo book is com-
pleteness. The topics covered in standard courses in contracts are, with one
exception, well covered. Where new concepts are evolving, such as the concept
of unconscionability which is evolving at an unconscionable rate, these topics,
too are touched upon. The reviewer has, as the course in contracts proceeded,
tried to use the treatise as a guide to how he might handle particular cases or
problems. Only one surprise was uncovered-the coverage of problems of mis-
take is peculiarly abbreviated, indeed almost nonexistent. It is a shame that one
may read the treatise without learning that there once were two Peerless ves-
sels-to the dismay of two merchants and of all law students since.
But even on a point like this, the dedicated researcher will find in a footnote
reference to Raffles v. Wichelhaus,7 so the point is not irretrievably lost. Fur-
ther, omission of this detail is a small price to pay to achieve a concise, usable
text.
RicHARc CosWAy*
REVIEW II
Far too frequently, student contracts texts serve only to bolster the egos of
their authors. They show how clever the authors are in spotting, and sometimes
offering solutions for, newly discovered problems; and allow, occasionally, the
clever fellows an opportunity to find a flaw in Corbin's reasoning. What such
7. 159 Eng. Rep. 375 (Ex. 1864).
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
[Vol. 39
BOOKS REVIEWED
treatises usually fail to do, however, is furnish the beleaguered student with an
aid that will help him understand the concepts that are, collectively, the law
of contracts. Professors Calamari and Perillo, by subverting their egos, have
served the student need well; and, in the process, have written an honest work
that might well be utilized by any lawyer in need of refreshing his recollections
of the law of contracts.
The authors' obvious concern with student needs is evident from even a
cursory perusal of this treatise. Preceding every chapter and subdivision thereof
is an "analysis." These carefully conceived analyses serve a far greater function
than merely to inform the reader of the subjects that will be discussed there-
after. Additionally, they constitute capsulized check-lists of the problems that
are encountered, and which must be dealt with, in each subject area. For ex-
ample, the analysis preceding the sections dealing with the concept of accep-
tance asks, inter alia, the following questions:
Must the Offeree Know of the Offer and if so at What Point of Time?
Must the Offeree Intend to Accept?
Who May Accept the Offer?
Must the Offeree Give Notice of the Acceptance of an Offer to a Unilateral Con-
tract?1
It is precisely these types of questions that a student-or a lawyer or judge-
must apply to a conglomeration of facts to determine whether an offer has been
properly accepted, thereby altering the legal status and obligations of the
parties. Thus, in the area of acceptance-as in all other areas of this treatise-
the "analysis" serves two vital functions as a student aid: (1) by flashing-in
the analysis from class notes and information taken from the text of the trea-
tise a student can prepare a complete outline of the concept of acceptance which
should prove invaluable for review; and (2) in its bare-bones form the analysis
serves as a check-list that can be applied to any set of facts that might be
encountered in an examination to determine if there has, or has not, been a
valid acceptance of what was previously concluded to be a valid offer.
Reading beyond the most helpful "analysis," the usefulness and validity of
the text becomes even more apparent. This is not a "rule-oriented" work-i4..,
each section is not prefaced by a rule of law-and the reader is not deluded
into thinking that it is of primary importance that he commit the rule to
memory. But, neither are those concepts that have achieved the status of
"rules" neglected. The authors, in narrative rather than dictatorial terms, tell
the students what the courts have generally done and then examine the past
decisions in the light of what the courts were trying to accomplish. Thus, the
student obtains some understanding of what the "rules" are without being
awed by their "black-letter" presence, and stands a better chance of being able
to evaluate these "rules" or holdings in the light of their intended purposes-
and this is what a contracts course is all about!
As a further aid to encouraging students to approach concepts in a "thinking"
manner rather than to memorize them, the authors make liberal use of hypo-
1. J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts 38 (1970).
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thetical and real case situations to illustrate their discussions of the various
concepts. Moreover, the illustrations chosen for such purposes are often cases
contained in most of the leading contracts casebooks. This is particularly helpful
to student readers in that it enables them, after reading and thinking about an
assigned case, to check their analysis against the analysis of the authors; pro-
viding, in some instances, a comforting assurance and, in others, a non-em-
barrassing warning that more penetrating analysis must be performed.
One final aspect of the treatise that makes it both a delight to read and a
welcomed student aid is its format. The large type, plentiful margin arrange-
ment seems to reach out and invite the student in to browse-as well as to
underline and jot down notesl And, the authors have arranged the book In
short sections that, even when picked out of context, can be beneficially read
by the student with a minimum of expended time and effort. Furthermore, the
authors, both whom obviously write with clarity and ease, have worked to
keep the basic text tight and to the point, with all ancillary or only peripherally
applicable discussion relegated to the footnotes. As a result, the book can be
read quickly and somewhat effortlessly-indeed, because of the frequent inter-
esting and often familiar case illustrations, even pleasurably, if that can be said
of any text! And, since what is being digested in so palatable a manner is a
legitimate discussion of important and complex concepts, this added dimension
of form and style lends much to the overall value of the treatise.
If the treatise has any flaws they are most likely sins of omission rather than
of commission. Long intrigued with the confusing concept of mistake, I would
have enjoyed reading what Professors Calamari and Perillo had to say about
my heroine, Rose II of Aberlone, 2 and about the hosts of innocent little girls
who travel about selling pebbles that are really diamonds to both suspecting,
and unsuspecting, vendees.3 And, I feel that a final chapter dealing with the
importance of the interrelation of contract concepts in determining the rights
and liabilities of the parties would have been useful to assist the student readers
to tie the course together. But, in order to find flaws I've had to look for the
picayune!
Professors Calamari and Perillo have written a most useful, and most legiti-
mate, student text. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of any student who, if he
attends classes and thinks as he reads this treatise, could not help but improve
his contracts grade.
ALFRED S. PELAEZ*
REVIEW III
Student texts were anathema to my old contracts teacher. It was bad enough
to sneak into the law library to find out just how Messrs. Williston and Corbin
2. Sherwood v. Walker, 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) (the case about tho lovely
bovine who, alas, could not conceive).
3. E.g., Wood v. Boynton, 64 Wis. 265, 25 N.W. 42 (1885).
* Professor, Duquesne University School of Law.
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explained why promissory estoppel did not save "Dear Sister Antillico" in
Kirksey v. Kirksey.' To stoop so low as to consult a mere hornbook was a foul
deed which induced in its perpetrators an acute sense of guilt and the fear of
perpetual commination.
To our teacher the casebook (preferably one hewing close to the Langdellian
pattern by dispensing with such frills as explanatory notes) was a self-contained
system. Being the master teacher that he was, he made it come to life. There
were no rules, only working hypotheses which we deduced ourselves with one
weather eye constantly peeled to the slightest changes in facts or policy matrix
that would test and delimit our tentative formulations. Naturally our teacher
was not about to have our carefully nurtured perceptions blunted by some
textwriter's capsuled half-truth that, e.g., offers were revoked upon insanity or
death.
Much can still be said for such heuristic method, but surely not even its
staunchest adherents will claim that it acquaints students with that large
portmanteau of legal problems which we call Contracts. Our subject matter is
snowballing. Large portions of Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code and
some parts of Article 9 are now legitimate grist for our mills. At the same time
we have to fend off rapacious curriculum planners who are ever plotting to
whittle down "core" courses to release more hours for such topical endeavors
as seminars on the population explosion.
I believe that a first year contracts course should subserve two functions.
The first is to initiate students into our "tribal rites" which encompass case
analysis, statutory interpretation, speculation about judicial behavior ante-
cedent and subsequent to the syllogistic exercise we call precedent, and so
forth.
The second is to encourage students to become broad-gauged lawyers who
can spot a contracts problem, classify it, and hammer it into researchable shape.
This knack for "spotting" or "classifying" a problem, which profoundly affects
the effectiveness of this research that follows it, is hardly an accident. It may
be the product of information remembered. It is more likely the product of
information seemingly forgotten, but which lingers on as a kind of trained or
programmed instinct, as a sense of relevancy that characterizes the better
lawyer. This means that at one time at least the student ought to absorb a
good deal of information. Not so much information about rules as information
about varied problems that call for their imaginative application.
In order to accomplish both of these functions I have for several years re-
quired that students buy a designated text and have held them responsible for
their readings both in class discussions and in final examinations. At the same
time I have pruned my casebook to a point where I can amble along at a more
leisurely pace and still cover the book.
Having just finished a term of use of the Calamari and Perillo book I might
as well give away my plot by stating that I have found it to be the best avail-
able student contracts text for the purposes described.
1. 8 Ala. 131 (1845).
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It is both manageably concise and, to a surprising extent, intelligibly de-
tailed.2 As a comparison of tables of cases reveals, most of the trend-making
decisions and venerable landmark cases encountered in the leading casebook
have found their way into this text. Although there is a sufficiency of brand-
fresh decisions the authors have happily resisted the temptation to display
that excessive amount of footnote learning which often induces a sense of futility
in students and frightens them away from the most scintillating materials. As
a student text should be, this book is more polyphyletic than profound. The
"masters" are freely quoted and cited. In the more complex areas that are
particularly in a state of flux the authors, rather than regaling the reader with
an overabundance of case citations, invite his attention to the most recent legal
articles. This should be useful even to the practitioner who seeks a time-saving
way of getting into a subject and therefore commends the book for inclusion
in his law library.
The authors' style is crisp. Sentences are generally terse. Overly subtle and
convoluted statements are avoided by the simple device of putting qualifications
and caveats into separate sentences. Different views and authorities, particularly
those that overlap and exhibit a surface similarity to each other, are clearly
delineated. Altogether there is a certain lean artistry about this book for which
the reader can only be grateful.
While structuring a doctrinal framework that is amply fleshed out with il-
lustrations, the authors have shied away from simplistic and superficial short-
hand formulations that lull the student into a deceptive sense of security and
completeness when he should instead be sensitized to the fact that all formula-
tions are provisional, not only the end product but also the starting point of
inquiry. This is achieved in two ways. First, the student is continually con-
fronted with a broad range of alternative solutions. Even in those placid areas
where one would think conflict has long been laid to rest and which therefore
invite black-letter treatment, the reader is given no respite. For example, after
making a convincing case for the proposition that the parol evidence rule does
not come into play until there is a writing, the reader is thrown off balance by
the observation that the parol evidence rule just might, in carefully articulated
circumstances, apply to an oral integration." He is thus constantly reminded
that credulity sits on a lawyer's head like a dunce cap.
Second, the authors tone down the process of reification which yields ab-
stractions that are easily memorized but are practically worthless, a form of
legal Esperanto. Doctrines are limned by the litigation context that has given
rise to them. Where they have not reached the stage of general propositions a
higher synthesis is either approached with circumspection or entirely avoided. 4
It is this overall feature which, more than any other, encourages the teacher
2. See, e.g., J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts §§ 287, 288, 289 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Calamari & Perillo] on The Main Purpose (or Leading Object) Rule
as an exception to the Statute of Frauds.
3. Id. § 40, at 76 n.5.
4. See, e.g., id. §§ 107, 108, 109 which discuss promissory estoppel in the context of sub-
contractors, franchises, and pension plans.
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to assign the book without fear that its use will undo the socratic accomplish-
ments of the classroom.
A few more outstanding features warrant comment. To my knowledge this is
the first student text in contracts which truly integrates the Uniform Com-
merical Code and the proposed Restatement of Contracts, Second. By that I
mean that these new materials are integrated as part of the original blueprint,
not as an afterthought with a few references tucked away in the footnotes or
a few slim sections sandwiched between prior sections as a result of a boiler-
plate editing venture. Sections like those matters on nonconforming acceptance
under section 2-207, 5 of the Statute of Frauds under section 2-201,0 on the
trend limiting the importance of the distinction between unilateral and bilateral
contracts under section 2-206 and proposed Restatement Second 7 are gems
which alone demonstrate conclusively the excellence of this book.
The reader is also given a binocular view of new trends which are either care-
fully articulated or, where this is still impossible, at least adumbrated. Partic-
ularly noteworthy examples are the sections on the future of promissory
estoppel,8 on the franchise cases and their gradual acceptance of a doctrine
analogous to culpa in contraktendo,0 on estoppel and its relation to the statute
of frauds,10 and on reliance damages as an alternative to compensatory dam-
ages.1 '
While the organization of the book proceeds on fairly orthodox lines without
radical departures from traditional compartmentalization, taxonomy and sym-
metry have generally been sacrificed for function with beneficial results for the
reader. For example, the parol evidence rule is not cradled in a single chapter
but is interspersed throughout the text. There is, of course a separate chapter
on the parol evidence rule,-2 but the reader also encounters the rule in those
contexts in which he is most likely to run into it in practice, in the chapters
on consideration,' 3 the statute of frauds,14 interpretation,", and waiver.10
As is to be expected, there are some features that evoke less enthusiasm and
some that are perceived as shortcomings. If I animadvert upon them it is not
because I want to remain in good standing with the Honorable Company of
Reviewers by writing a "balanced" critique, but simply because they are there.
It seems a pity that a contracts text which contains a splendid chapter on
damages and covers restitution in virtually all its forms should treat equitable
5. Id. § 32.
6. Id. § 297.
7. Id. § 38.
8. Id. §§ 110-11.
9. Id. § lo.
10. I& §§ 326-27.
11. Id.§ 210.
12. Id. chapter 3.
13. Id. § 77.
14. Id. § 308.
15. Id. § so.
16. Id. § 167.
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remedies with such parisimony. Specific performance is encountered but once
when the reader is informed that the presence of a liquidated damages clause
does not prevent recourse to this remedy. 17 There are two fleeting references
to reformation in the body of the book18 and footnotes twice caution the reader
that reformation is not within the purview of this text.'0
Given the fact that many casebook assignments deal with specific perfor-
mance and the further fact that one can easily overestimate the sweep of the
parol evidence rule unless one is made aware of the availability of reformation,
this omission appears unjustified.
The problem of mistake has also been given wallflower treatment. Mistakes
as to identity 20 and mistakes in the transmission of offers21 are barely touched
upon. Mutual mistakes of the Sherwood v. Walker22 variety and unilateral mis-
takes are not mentioned at all. Yet surely coverage of the contract formation
process appears a bit lopsided if one ignores mistakes that represent important
formation defects.
Although the authors do not lack that sure instinct for cases that yield the
most mileage, there are several leading cases that perhaps should have received
more amplification. To cite a random instance: Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors23 is a landmark case in the field of disclaimer of automobile warranties.
It is cited three times in footnotes and always in support of fairly bland and
general statements.2 4 It is only in connection with its third appearance in the
footnotes that the reader is given an inkling that the case involved an exculpa-
tory clause25 (which, arguably, is a slight misnomer).
Sometimes statements in the text are so pithy that they cannot be compre-
hended without reading their supportive authority in the footnote.2 0 This
appears self-defeating, for one need hardly document the well established
phenomenon that most students would prefer to leave a gap in their legal educa-
tion than go to the law library to decode a footnote.
I have only found one error, or better, what I believe to be an error. Clark
v. West,27 the case of the thirsty law book writer, is used to illustrate the prop-
osition that a waiver before breach of condition requires no consideration but
does require detrimental reliance.28 In this context the case makes no sense.
17. Id. § 234.
18. Id. § 42; § 313, at 486. I could not find any reference to reformation on page 76
despite the index's claim to the contrary.
19. Id. § 308, at 481 n.36; § 313, at 486 n.71.
20. Id.§ 27.
21. Id.§ 36.
22. 66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887).
23. 32 NJ. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
24. Calamari & Perillo § 3, at 6 n.16; § 25, at 39 n.30; § 56, at 111 n.50.
25. Id. § 56, at 111 n.50.
26. E.g., the illustrations in § 106 are of little use because the type of reliance Is not
indicated.
27. 193 N.Y. 349, 86 N.E. 1 (1908).
28. Calamari & Perillo § 168, at 272.
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However, it would make sense if it were used to illustrate a waiver after the
breach which requires no detrimental reliance.
In order to add to the book's utility it is suggested that the authors consider
adding a table of Uniform Commercial Code citations, Restatement citations,
and perhaps a table of leading articles cited in their next edition.
Last but by no means least, there is one omission which strikes me as infelici-
tous. The authors have generally ignored civil rights and consumer protection
materials or limited them to a "But see .. ." treatment in an occasional foot-
note.29 I am by no means saying that they should have yielded to the topical
and embraced every croisade du jour. The inclusion of some contemporary
materials would surely date this text more swiftly than their exclusion. Thus
an extensive treatment of topical "credit card" cases would have been rendered
obsolete by recent federal legislation.
I am saying, however, that some such materials should have been included
in order to put into sharp relief the materials on freedom of contract and the
contract formation process. For example, how valid are conventional assump-
tions that preliminary negotiations are not binding and that offers need not be
accepted in light of the Fair Housing Act, 0 which prohibits certain home
owners who use the services of brokers from discriminating by refusing to sell
or rent after a bona fide offer is made?
How valid are conventional assumptions regarding the formation process in
light of the recent Door-To-Door Sales Acts3 l which provide for "decompres-
sion" periods and allow consumers to cancel certain contracts, and of the Truth
in Lending Act32 which contains similar provisions for transactions resulting
in a lien upon the consumer's home. The section on freedom of contract-a and
cognate sections,3 4 although otherwise excellent, hardly do justice to this theme.
Since such recent statutes govern a sizeable percentage of our total contract
activities, they cannot be dismissed as insignificant exceptions or relegated
solely to civil rights or consumer protection seminars. They should be men-
tioned, if only in outline or skeleton form, in the context of contract formation.
I hope that my critical comments have not degenerated into mere flyspecking.
There is always a temptation for reviewers to criticize authors for not writing
the book that the reviewers would have written, had they been blessed with the
authors' stamina and talents. I also hope that my choice of the word "best"
will not be considered a blatant use of hyperbole in light of my criticisms. I
do believe that this is the best student text for those contracts teachers who do
not want to lose in breadth what they gain in depth. Although the opinions
of first-year first-semester students on the efficacy of their teaching materials
29. See, e.g., § 41, at 83 n.42 containing a passing reference to the New York Retail
Installment Sales Act.
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601, 3603(b) (1), 3604 (Supp. V, 1970).
31. For general discussion see Sher, The "Cooling-OW' Period in Door to Door Sales, 15
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 717 (1968).
32. Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1635 (Supp. V, 1970).
33. Calamari & Perillo § 3.
34. Id. §§ 17-18.
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should perhaps be taken with a grain of salt, I shall not omit to mention that
student comments elicited in anonymous course evaluations do, on the whole,
agree with my own assessment.3 5
MAX A. PocK*
35. Because of an administrative error only about two-thirds of the students in my
two sections filled out their evaluation forms. Since the forms encouraged students to write
out their comments (which sometimes ran to two or more sentences or paragraphs) I found
it necessary to translate these into some sort of scale in order to make them more mean-
ingful. In constructing the scale I have used the "key" words which I have found In the
comments.
It must also be noted that many students complained about printing errors in the book.
DAY EVENWo
COMMENT DMSIoN DivIsboN TOTAL
1. Excellent,
of tremen-
dous help 20 10 30
2. Good 22 20 42
3. Adequate,
satisfactory,
useful 5 23 28
4. Sometimes
confusing
and difficult
to understand.
Not as useful as
instructor might
think 9 7 16
5. Inadequate,
poor 2 3 5
6. No comment 8 8 16
Number of
students handing
in evaluation
forms 66 71 137
* Professor of Law, George Washington University Law Center.
BOOKS REVIEWED
World Trade and the Law of GATT. John H. Jackson. New York: Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc. 1969. Pp. xl, 948. $27.50.
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT,' is a series of multi-
lateral international agreements in which more than seventy-five countries
participate.2 It governs to some degree about eighty per cent of world trade.
The tariff negotiations-held in a succession of "rounds" under the auspices
of GATT-have played an important part in reducing tariffs to a point where
they probably no longer constitute an effective barrier to world trade. GATT
has similarly produced a dismantling by the world's industrialized countries
of most quantitative restrictions on the importation of industrial products
into those countries.
And yet, once tariffs have been laid aside, nations resort to the more subtle
non-tariff trade barriers. This book opens with the observation that within
six months after the June 30, 1967 signing of the Final Act of the Kennedy
Round of trade negotiations, both Great Britain and the United States were
adopting trade restrictive policies because of balance-of-payments difficulties?
Merely one year after this book's publication, the United States Senate was
considering legislation passed by the House, the so-called Trade Act of 1970,4
which among other things would, in apparent violation of GATT, have main-
tained for an indefinite future annual quotas on textile articles and shoes to
be imported into the United States5 The Senate Committee on Finance was,
moreover, striking from the bill the appropriation for the United States' share
of GATT expenses, and was proposing amendments which would require the
Executive Branch to study GATT and report to Congress about a variety
of practices by other countries under (or in spite of) GATT which are arguably
unfavorable to the United States and discriminate against it.0
The Trade Act of 1970 died with the end of the 91st Congress, but it re-
mains significant that, in considering that bill, the United States, a moving
force in the creation of GATT and originally a crusader against quantitative
restrictions (QR's) or quotas, was contemplating the increased use of QR's
1. GATT is only the first of the acronyms with which the reader of this work must
become familiar. There are others such as OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development), OEEC (Organization for European Economic Cooperation), and
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) which might have been
added to the list of abbreviations immediately preceding Chapter 1.
2. For a list of GATT Participating Countries, see J. Jackson, World Trade and the Law
of GATT 898-901 (app. D) [hereinafter cited as Jask on].
3. Jackson 1-2.
4. HR. 18970, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
S. These quotas would have been subject to waiver by the President where imports were
found to be non-disruptive or where quotas were otherwise found not to be in the national
interest. Id. at 31-32.
6. Press Release from the Senate Committee on Finance, Nov. 30, 1970.
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as a protectionist device. As this book explains, GATT is also being violated
both by the other developed7 and the developing nations.8
GATT is, however, far from dead, and Professor Jackson's work is of
high interest because of the timeliness and importance of its technical subject
matter. The determination of European countries to free themselves from
what they considered to be the subjection of their economies to undesired
influences consequent upon the American balance-of-payments deficit suggests
that the future of the American trade account, and the influence of GATT
thereon, will be of the greatest significance in the foreign affairs of the United
States. Also of interest is the book's illumination of the blend of international
jurisprudence and politics, of which GATT is a prime example. The author ex-
plains those various obligations--"hard" or "soft"--which GATT purports
to impose on its members.' 0 He recounts the shifting recourse of the member
nations to and from the "legal process" and the "negotiation" procedures of
GATT in their economic struggles with each other."1
Professor Jackson indicates that there are at least three purposes intended
to be served by this work: presentation of an analysis of GATT to the person
approaching that institution for the first time; presentation of GATT to
the lawyer or official attempting to solve a practical problem involving GATT;
and investigation of GATT as an institution with a jurisprudence all its own.' 2
Through no fault of the author, accomplishment of these intended purposes is
impeded, at least as to the first two aims, by the difficulty of the GATT treaty
text. The initial pages of the book contain Senator Millikin's famous comment:
"Anyone who reads GATT is likely to have his sanity impaired."' 8 The reader
finds himself constantly shifting between the author's explanations and the
treaty text, reproduced in an appendix at the back of the book, in search of
some concise statement of the GATT provision under consideration. A future
edition would perhaps be improved as a learning tool for the beginner by the
addition of a synopsis of the thirty-eight GATT articles.
Much space is devoted to the preparatory work, or what may be called the
"legislative history" of GATT, with copious footnote references to the sources.
In some instances this history is quite interesting. An example is the description
of the contest, which occured during the early conferences in London, Havana
and Geneva, between the United States and the other delegations concerning
quantitative restrictions.' 4 In other instances, as with national legislation, the
legislative history is inconclusive and uninformative.
For the lawyer or official with a practical problem, who must bring to bear
7. Jackson 668.
8. Id. at 670.
9. Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
10. Each obligation is subject to "universal exceptions," while some of the less harsh
regulations admit of exceptions peculiar to themselves. Jackson 537-39.
11. Id. at 760-61, 763-68.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. Id. at vii.
14. Id. at 308-14, 628-40.
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every available resource in support of the position for which he is contending,
footnote references to source material and other documentation are of great
value. For the reader interested in learning how GATT actually has worked,
it would be helpful to have the footnotes expanded, in some cases, to include a
summary of the facts of the incident in question. An example is the case where
the United States was permitted waiver of its obligation under GATT article
XI to abstain from quantitative restrictions on imports, so that it might legit-
imize domestic import quotas on fats, oils, and dairy products erected by the
1951 amendments to the Defense Production Act of 195016 and to section 22
of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.16 Unfortunately, this subject is mentioned
several times, 17 without clear indication of why the quotas established by
these amendments fail to qualify under the exception for agricultural and
fisheries products to the ban of article X on quantitative restrictions.
This is a comprehensive work on GATT, with detailed discussion of the
various GATT obligations such as most-favored-nation treatment in the ap-
plication of tariff concessions,' 8 national treatment in the application of in-
ternal taxation to imported products,' 9 operation of state trading enterprises
and monopolies, 20 subsidies,21 and antidumping and countervailing duties.P
There is also detailed discussion of the exceptions to the GATT obligations
such as waivers,2 the escape clause,24 the balance-of-payments exception,25
free trade areas,26 and customs unions.27 Much attention is given to the sub-
ject of developing countries and GATT. The author sets forth the considerable
indulgence exercised under GATT in favor of the developing countries2s and
discusses Part IV of GATT,29 added for their particular benefit in 1965.
Professor Jackson's book includes thoughtful observations on the possibilities
for international cooperation in trade and on what it is wise to attempt.5 0
Thus he discusses what obligations it is reasonable to expect sovereign states
to undertake with respect to each other and the degree of flexibility which
it is necessary to accept in the performance of those obligations. He notes
with concern the tendency of GATT obligations to become diluted. For example,
15. Act of July 31, 1951, ch. 276, § 104, 65 Stat. 132.
16. Act of June 19, 1951, ch. 141, § 8, 65 Stat. 75.
17. Jackson 308, 319 (quantitative restrictions), 546 (waivers under GATT art. XXV),
733-37 (agriculture and commodities).
18. Id. at 249-72.
19. Id. at 279-86.
20. Id. at 329-64.
21. Id. at 365-99.
22. Id. at 401-26.
23. Id. at 541-52.
24. Id. at 553-73.
25. Id. at 673-716.
26. Id. at 618-21.
27. Id. at 610-18.
28. E.g., id. at 670-71.
29. Id. at 640-48.
30. Id. at 769-88.
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the "escape clause" of article XIX81 is hedged about by various testrictions in
the GATT text, but it has been interpreted in a way which seems to make a
mere rapid, increase in the proportion of imports to domestic production suffi-
cient to justify recourse to this escape clause.3 2
Interesting contrasts are also drawn between the present and prior positions
taken by the United States. At the beginning of the GATT negotiations, the
United States was somewhat doctrinaire and "legalistic" on issues such as quan-
titative restrictions. On the other hand, it was "pragmatic" or loose on such
matters as the consistency of the Rome treaty83 and the European Economic
Community (EEC) with the legal requirements of GATT. More recently the
United States has to some extent shifted its position in respect to quotas, and,
on the other side of the coin, has come to have second thoughts about the
legal consistency of the EEC with the customs union and free trade area
provisions of GATT article XXIV. Here the variable levy on agricultural
products introduced into the EEC is a particular thorn. So also is the subse-
quent formation of special trading arrangements of the six countries of the
EEC with eighteen African associated overseas territories, as well as Greece,
Turkey, Tunisia, Morrocco and now with Israel and Spain. Perhaps a country
in the position occupied by the United States at the end of World War II should
beware of being too eager to impose its notions of polity on others not at that
moment enjoying the same power and independence. Perhaps also such a
country should beware of how far it encourages other countries to join in
groups to rival with it. This may be the most valuable lesson taught us by
GATT and its progeny.
J. PHILIP ANDEREGO*
31. Id. at 553-73. This article permits a member country to suspend an obligation as-
sumed by it under GATT, such as a tariff ceiling on a particular product to which it is
"bound" by a "concession" entered into under GATT, if as a result of unforeseen develop-
ments that obligation causes a product to be imported into the territory of that country
in such quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to
domestic producers of like or directly competitive products.
32. An example of such an invocation of the escape clause is discussed in Jackson at
560-63.
33. Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 295
U.N.T.S. 3.
* Member, New York Bar and Lecturer in Law at The Columbia Law School.
